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1 Introduction
Loss aversion, also termed the disposition effect, is a behavioral bias that may affect
investors. Shefrin and Statman (1985) introduce the concept to describe the observation
that investors appear to be reluctant to realize losses. The concept draws upon prospect
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), mental accounting (Shefrin and Thaler, 2004;
Thaler, 2004, 2008), aversion to regret (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Thaler, 1980),
and the ability to exercise self-control (Shefrin and Thaler, 2004). For instance, Odean
(1998) and Ivkovic´, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005) provide evidence of the disposition
effect among individual investors using data from stock and mutual fund transactions. 1
While the observation of the disposition effect originates in passive financial security
investments such as stocks and mutual funds, investors in real assets such as real estate
may also continue to hold poorly performing assets while selling strongly performing
assets. These patterns are observed among individual and institutional investors (Bokhari
and Geltner, 2011; Genesove and Mayer, 2001) and REITs (Crane and Hartzell, 2010).
However, claims of a disposition effect in real estate often ignore the active manage-
ment aspect of real estate investment that may alter disposition decisions. In contrast
to many of the passively held financial securities where the disposition effect was first
observed, real estate demands active management of daily operational activities that
include general maintenance as well as decisions regarding subsequent investment in
the property. As a result, an alternative rational explanation may exist to explain the
observed disposition effect whereby investors pursue a value-add strategy and keep a
property until they have made sufficient improvements to that property to realize a
profit on the sale. Such a property may well perform poorly in the interim and thus
could result in outcomes that are observationally similar to the ones that led prior be-
havioral work to conclude existence of a disposition effect. Importantly, prior work has
made efforts to rule out alternative explanations but has stopped short of addressing the
possibility of a rational value-add strategy behind the observed disposition patterns.
1 Ben-David and Hirshleifer (2012) concisely summarize the literature. DellaVigna (2009) provides a general
survey of the evidence on reference dependence.
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In this study, we use information about value-add strategies and subsequent dispo-
sition decisions through the property cycle to address this gap in the literature. An
important mechanism by which investors implement value-add strategies is through
value-enhancing improvements via capital expenditures. Empirical evidence supports
the link between capital expenditures and value. Using property-level data, Ghosh and
Petrova (2015) for instance find that capital expenditures increase property value. Sep-
arately, Bond, Shilling, and Wurtzebach (2014) point out that capital expenditures are
not mandatory. In fact, investors have a real option to make improvements now, or delay
them. Peng and Thibodeau (2011) and Ghosh and Petrova (2015) provide evidence in
favor of this real options view on capital expenditures.
Consistent with this view, we model the capital expenditure decision as a real option
to restore a property that has suffered physical depreciation and economic obsolescence to
its new, undepreciated state. We argue that investors make capital expenditure decisions
to maximize the expected payoff from this option.
In addition, we recognize the fact that investors also have an option to dispose of
the property. Like the capital expenditure decision, the disposition decision is closely
related to the economic environment. To illustrate these relationships, we introduce the
concepts of highest and best use versus second best use into the modeling framework.
Combining the concepts regarding the optimal time to invest in capital expenditures
with the classic highest and best use assumption, we develop a set of testable hypotheses
about the likelihood of sale following capital expenditure decisions. By also incorporating
past capital appreciation returns into the empirical analysis, we are then in a position
to compare our predictions with the evidence for the disposition effect (Bokhari and
Geltner, 2011; Crane and Hartzell, 2010; Genesove and Mayer, 2001).
Consistent with our hypotheses, we present empirical evidence that an increase in
expected market rents increases the payoff and likelihood of capital expenditures. This
occurs because the cash flow underlying the option to invest in capital expenditures is
the income from the property in its existing depreciated condition. Our findings thus
add to the evidence for capital expenditures as a real option, as in Bond, Shilling, and
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Wurtzebach (2014); Ghosh and Petrova (2015); Peng and Thibodeau (2011).
We also find that higher capital expenditures are associated with higher subsequent
real capital appreciation returns. Our result is consistent with Ghosh and Petrova (2015)
who find that CAPEX are positively related to excess NPI returns. We extend this prior
work by considering the effect of CAPEX on capital appreciation specifically, rather
than total NPI returns. Our work thus helps distinguish between the findings in Ghosh
and Petrova (2015) and those in Bond, Shilling, and Wurtzebach (2014) who report that
CAPEX are associated with higher income but are not capitalized into market values.
Finally, we find an inverse relationship between capital expenditures on building
expansion and improvement and dispositions. This finding is consistent with a value-
add strategy where the owner carries out multi-period investment projects that help
reposition the property to its undepreciated state, enabling the owner to capture full
market lease rates.
In all of our models, we are unable to replicate the disposition effect, measured as a
positive coefficient on the cumulative capital appreciation return of the property (Crane
and Hartzell, 2010), after controlling for capital expenditures. In conclusion therefore,
we present evidence for a rational value-add investment strategy as an alternative expla-
nation for the disposition effect that has been documented in residential and commercial
real estate investment. Our finding implies that the evidence for this behavioral bias is
not robust to controlling for this observationally similar but rational alternative. Our
findings suggest that future research into this question should account for the value-add
and potentially other alternative explanations for the disposition effect.
2 Related literature
Behavioral finance and economics attempts to explain seemingly irrational actions of
individuals. For example, financial researchers have explored behavioral factors in cor-
porate decision-making; see Baker and Wurgler (2011) for a survey of the literature. One
stream of this literature assumes that managers are subject to behavioral biases that
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stem from bounded rationality (Gabaix, 2014) or overconfidence (Ben-David and Gra-
ham, 2013). Malmendier and Tate (2015) survey the literature on overconfidence. These
managerial biases are further enabled by limited governance (Adams, Almeida, and Fer-
reira, 2005; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). Managerial
irrationality then has significant consequences for the investment policy (Malmendier
and Tate, 2005) and the financial policy (Baker and Xuan, 2016) of the firm.
An alternative view is that managers respond rationally to mis-pricing of securities
due to behavioral biases among investors, giving rise to market timing and catering
considerations. Studies in this vein analyze the effects of security mis-pricing on invest-
ment policy (see, e.g., Polk and Sapienza (2009) or Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003));
financial policy (see, e.g., Graham and Harvey (2001) for survey evidence and Baker
and Wurgler (2002) or Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler (2003) for empirical evidence
on timing of equity and debt issuance choices, respectively); payout choices (Baker and
Wurgler, 2004); and a range of other corporate policies.
Research in real estate has confirmed the effects of managerial biases, especially over-
confidence, on the investment (Eichholtz and Yo¨nder, 2015) and financing (Yung, Li,
and Sun, 2015) choices of real estate firms (REITs). Similarly, market timing and cater-
ing considerations stemming from behavioral biases among investors have been shown to
affect REIT financing choices (Boudry, Kallberg, and Liu, 2010; Harrison, Panasian, and
Seiler, 2011; Mori, Ooi, and Wong, 2014; Ooi, Ong, and Li, 2010) and dividend policy
(Boudry, 2011; Case, Hardin, and Wu, 2012; Chou, Hardin, Hill, and Kelly, 2013). 2
As for the disposition effect, Genesove and Mayer (2001) are the first to document loss
aversion in real property. Using data on the Boston housing market, they find that home-
owners subject to losses on the sale of their home set higher asking prices, attain higher
selling prices, and are significantly less likely to sell than other owners. They conclude
that, consistent with the disposition effect, homeowners are reluctant to realize losses.
2 Seiler (2014) points out that there are broader applications of behavioral concepts in real estate, such as the
familiarity bias of homeowners towards their existing property or the endowment effect, which is linked to mental
accounting and may explain why homeowners require a larger compensation to give up their home than simply
the value of a similar asset. Furthermore, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2013) examine behavioral factors in
determinants of attitudes towards strategic mortgage default.
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Bokhari and Geltner (2011) extend this evidence to commercial real estate investors,
who may be more sophisticated and thus less sensitive to loss aversion. Using a data set
of US commercial real estate transactions, they confirm that investors facing a loss set
higher asking prices, achieve higher transaction prices and experience a longer time-on-
market, implying a lower hazard rate of sale. Finally, Crane and Hartzell (2010) explore
the evidence for the disposition effect in corporate-level REIT investments. They find
that REIT managers also tend to sell strongly performing properties while continuing
to hold poorly performing investments.
While prior work rules out some alternative explanations for the observed patterns,
particularly in relation to the hazard rate of sale – such as optimal tax timing, mean
reverting property returns, and asymmetric information (Crane and Hartzell, 2010) –
the literature stops short of considering the possibility of a typical value-add investment
strategy that requires holding the property through a phase of poor performance until
capital expenditures improve its value enough to produce a gain on sale. This alternative
explanation for the observed disposition patterns is the focus of our study.
3 Hypothesis development
3.1 Model setup
We adopt the real option analysis presented in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Pindyck
(1988), and Bertola (1998) for incremental investment problems to the case of commercial
real estate to highlight the optionality associated with capital expenditure investment
decisions. Abstracting from discussion of fixed and variable costs, we assume that a
property generates the following simple profit flow
pi=HM(K) (1)
where M(K) is a concave function of capital (K) invested in the property, and H is a
random shift variable reflecting uncertainty over future rents. We assume that H can be
described by the geometric Brownian motion such that
6
dHt =αHHtdt+ σHHtdzH (2)
where αH and σH are the expected growth rate and volatility associated with the market
rents, respectively, and E
[
dz2H
]
= dt. For analytical convenience, we assume that the
function M(K) takes a specialized Cobb-Douglas form
M(K) =Kθ, 0 < θ < 1. (3)
Finally, we note that κ represents unit cost of capital.
3.2 Depreciation and capital expenditures
If we assume that physical depreciation and economic obsolescence occurs exponen-
tially through time following a Poisson process, then over a small time increment of dt,
the invested capital in the property will depreciate with probability λKdt. Furthermore,
assuming no investments in capital expenditures, then the property will depreciate at
the rate dK = −λKdt and the rental flow at time t is HtM(Ke−λt). Thus, the expected
value of the property at the date of purchase is
V (K,H) = Eˆ
∫ ∞
0
HtM(Ke
−λt)e−ρtdt (4)
where ρ is the discount rate. Using Ito’s lemma, we can show that (4) is the solution to
the following differential equation
1
2
σ2H2
∂2V
∂H2
+ αH
∂2V
∂H
− λK ∂V
∂K
− ρV +HM(K) = 0. (5)
Next, we note that if the owner makes capital expenditures of dKg, then the change in
capital invested in the property is given as
dK = dKg − λKdt (6)
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and we denote the option to make these investments as F (K,H).
Using the usual assumptions associated with the contingent claims approach to real
option models regarding the creation of a replicating portfolio with an asset spanning
H, we get
1
2
σ2H2
∂2F
∂H2
+ (r − δ)H ∂F
∂H
− λK ∂F
∂K
− rF = 0 (7)
where r is the risk-free rate, δ = µ−αH , and the risk-adjusted discount rate µ is used in
place of ρ. Differentiating (7) with respect to capital K results in the following equation
for the value of the marginal capital expenditure investment option (f(K,H)):
1
2
σ2H2
∂2f(K,H)
∂H2
+ (r − δ)H∂f(K,H)
∂H
−λK∂f(K,H)
∂K
− (r + λ)f(K,H) = 0 (8)
Since M(K) = Kθ by assumption in equation (3), we can assume that the capital
expenditure option depends on the composite variable h = HKθ−1. Thus, substituting
∂f(K,H)
∂H = K
θ−1g′(h) where f(K,H) = g(h) yields
1
2
σ2h2
∂2g(h)
∂h2
+ [r − (δ + λ(θ − 1))]h∂g(h)
∂h
− (r + λ)g(h) = 0. (9)
Equation (9) that has the solution
g(h) =Bhβ1 (10)
where β1 is the positive root of the quadratic that corresponds to equation (9).
3 Fol-
lowing the exposition in Dixit and Pindyck (1994), the optimal rent (H∗) that triggers
investments in capital expenditures is
3 β1 =
1
2 − (r − (δ + λ(θ − 1))/σ2 +
√
[(r − (δ + λ(θ − 1)))/σ2 − 12 ]2 + 2r/σ2
8
H∗=
β1
β1 − 1
(δ + λθ)κ
θKθ−1
(11)
From equation (11), we can see that an increase in the growth rate associated with
market rents (α) reduces the critical value necessary to trigger capital expenditures and
thus decreases the delay between capital expenditure investments. Next, an increase
in the volatility surrounding market rents (σ) increases the trigger value and thus re-
sults in a longer time between capital expenditure investments. These relationships are
illustrated numerically in Figure 1.
[Figure 1 about here.]
3.3 The disposition decision
In order to analyze the decision to sell the investment, we note that the property’s
current owner, as the marginal investor, deploys the building at its highest and best
use, which is assumed to follow the rent process described in equation (2). The concept
of highest and best use (HBU) is a standard convention in the real estate literature
that implies that property owners maximize value otherwise there would be incentives
to trade. To capture this incentive, we assume that the building could be redeployed
by a new owner at a second best use (SBU) who would then realize a rental flow that
corresponds to a random shift variable (S) reflecting uncertainty over future rents. As
with the highest and best use case described above, we assume that the second best
random shift variable is described by the following geometric Brownian motion:
dSt =αSStdt+ σSStdzS (12)
where αS and σS are the expected growth rate and volatility associated with the SBU
rents, respectively, and E
[
dz2S
]
= dt. Thus, as with the case of the highest and best use
and recognizing that a property deployed at its SBU also depreciates at the rate −λKdt,
the value of the property when utilized at its the second best rental flow is given as
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V (K,S) =E
∫ ∞
0
StM(Ke
−λt)e−ρtdt. (13)
We now focus on the evolution of H and S through time that creates opportunities
to trade. We note that the current owner’s opportunity to sell the property is equivalent
to a perpetual put option. In this context, we denote the value of the option to sell as
W (K,H, S) since it is a function of two stochastic variables. The payoff at any time t to
selling the property is V (K,S, t) − V (K,H, t). Thus, the owner maximizes the present
value of the payoff:
W (K,H, S) = max Eˆ[(V (K,S, T ) − V (K,H, T )), 0]e−µT (14)
where T is the unknown future date that the property is sold, and µ is the discount
rate. Using Ito’s Lemma and denoting the correlation between H and S as ρHS with
E [dzHdzS ] = ρHSdt, the value of this disposition option is the solution to the following
partial differential equation:
dW =
1
2
[
σ2HH
2∂
2W
∂H2
+ σ2SS
2∂
2W
∂S2
+ 2ρHSσHσSHS
∂2W
∂H∂S
]
+
∂W
∂H
dH +
∂W
∂S
dS. (15)
Obviously, equation (15) is a complicated partial differential equation that can be solved
numerically. The complication arise by recognizing the path dependency inherent in the
capital expenditure option. That is, the HBU value of the property at any point t that
determines whether it is optimal to sell to the second best user is conditional on knowing
whether the owner invested in capital expenditures during the period prior to t.
Following classical option pricing insights, we note that: (i) A higher growth rate in
current market HBU rents (αH), holding all else constant, decreases the critical threshold
for capital expenditures and thus increasing the property value. This results in decreasing
the payoff and probability of selling the investment; (ii) Conversely, a higher growth rate
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in the second best rental use (S), holding all else constant, would increase the probability
of selling. Thus, the probability of selling is a function of the relative difference in the
rental growth rates. In other words, the probability of selling is an increasing function
of the ratio of the SBU rent growth rate to the HBU rent growth rate ( αSαH ). Similarly,
the probability of selling increases as the ratio of SBU rent volatility (σS) to HBU rent
volatility (σH) increases. Note that an increase in σH lowers the probability of capital
expenditure investments and therefore increases the probability of disposition.
We also note that differences in expectations regarding economic and physical de-
preciation can also alter the probability of exercising the option to sell. For example, if
buildings deployed at their highest and best use require higher levels of maintenance or
experience greater utilization, then the probability of sale will increase.
Finally, the option to invest in capital expenditures impacts the decision to sell in
two ways. First, past cumulative investments in capital expenditures increase the HBU
valuation and thus reduces the payoff from selling to the SBU investor and hence reduces
the probability of sale. Second, the option to make future capital expenditures to offset
the effects of depreciation increases the property value to the HBU owner, again lowering
the potential payoff from disposition and reducing the probability of sale. However,
increases in HBU depreciation increase the trigger threshold for capital expenditures
and thus lowers the property value. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship and suggests
that on balance, the probability of sale declines in capital expenditures.
[Figure 2 about here.]
4 Empirical approach
Empirically, we observe neither market rents, in the sense of the notional rent that
would be achieved by a brand-new building, nor obsolescence. Rather, we observe realized
income that is the net result of market rents, cumulative depreciation, and the extent
to which depreciation was mitigated by capital expenditures. Furthermore, we do not
observe uncertainty around market rental growth and depreciation separately from one
11
another either. Instead, we observe shocks to expected property-level income growth. As
a result, we have the following empirically testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 follows by noting that observed property income is a function of expected
income and actual obsolescence. An increase in expected income reduces the critical value
of rent necessary to trigger capital expenditures and decreases the delay between capital
expenditures. In other words, higher expected income growth increases the payoff and
likelihood of capital expenditures.
Hypothesis 1: An increase in expected income growth from the property increases
subsequent capital expenditures.
Based on the real options framework, keeping everything else constant, uncertainty
increases the value of keeping the option alive and not exercising in the current period.
Therefore, an increase in the volatility of income growth increases the threshold value of
rent necessary to carry out capital expenditures and thus produces a longer time delay
between capital expenditure investments, reducing their likelihood.
Hypothesis 2: Higher income growth volatility reduces subsequent capital expenditures.
To formally test hypotheses 1 and 2, we estimate the following OLS model of the real
quarterly capital expenditures per square foot for property i at time t (CAPEXi,t) as a
function of income growth expectations and volatility in the previous period t− 1:
CAPEXi,t = γ0 + γ1GEi,t−1 + γ2V OLi,t−1 + γ3Xi,t−1 + uit (16)
where γ denotes the coefficients to be estimated, GEi,t−1 is the expected rate of property
income growth at time t − 1, V OLi,t−1 is the volatility of growth expectations over
the preceding four quarters up to and including t − 1, scaled by the average growth
expectation over that period, Xt−1 is a matrix of control variables measured at time
t− 1, and uit is the residual. For CAPEX, we distinguish between capital expenditures
on expansion and improvement as well as tenant incentives and lease commissions. The
control variables include the one-period real income return, the loan-to-value ratio, the
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time since acquisition, property size (sq ft), the log of the initial real market value, as
well as indicators for property type, geographic region (division), and quarter. Consistent
with Hypotheses 1 and 2, we expect a positive value for γ1 and a negative value for γ2.
The model also predicts that CAPEX will increase the value of the property. This is
not a direct prediction, but is implied by the model. As per hypothesis 1, higher rental
growth is associated with an increased likelihood of CAPEX, and results in higher prop-
erty values. At the same time, property values increase with CAPEX because CAPEX
restore the property to an undepreciated state and enable the owner to capture the full
market rent, reinforcing the positive effect on values and supporting capital appreciation.
Hypothesis 3: An increase in CAPEX increases capital appreciation returns.
In order to test hypothesis 3, we estimate the following OLS model of real quarterly
capital appreciation returns for property i in quarter t (APPi,t) as a function of real
cumulative CAPEX up to an including t− 1:
APPi,t = γ0 + γ1CAPEXi,t−1 + γ2Xi,t−1 + uit (17)
where notation and control variables are as in Equation (16) above. Consistent with
hypothesis 3, we expect a positive value on coefficient γ1. Here, we focus on real cumu-
lative capital expenditures, again split into expansion and improvement versus tenant
incentives and lease commissions, in order to account for the fact that more extensive
capital expenditure projects take several quarters to complete. Cumulative real CAPEX
are scaled by the initial real market value of the property.
Finally, the model predicts a lower likelihood of sale following higher CAPEX. Again,
this is not directly observed but it is implicit in the model. Higher CAPEX implies a
higher HBU property value and thus the probability that the SBU value will be greater
than the HBU value is reduced, all else being equal. Therefore, the probability of a sale
declines following higher CAPEX.
Hypothesis 4: Higher capital expenditures reduce the subsequent likelihood of sale.
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To test hypothesis 4, we follow the empirical strategy proposed in Kiefer (1988). 4
Specifically, we employ a hazard model of the holding period where the probability of
selling property i at time t, given that it was not yet sold, is modeled as:
h(i, t) = h0(i, t) exp(γ1CAPEXi,t−1 + γ2CAPPi,t−1 + γ3Xi,t−1) (18)
where h0(i, t) denotes the baseline hazard rate, CAPEX measures cumulative CAPEX up
to and including t−1, CAPP is the cumulative real appreciation return, which serves as
proxy for the disposition effect, and Xt−1 contains the covariates from Equation (16). We
estimate the coefficients via Cox’s partial likelihood method. Following standard practice,
properties that are not sold during the sample period are included in the estimation but
are considered right censored. Consistent with hypothesis 4, we expect a negative sign
on the coefficient γ1. The disposition effect would predict a positive value for γ2.
5 Data
Our data consists of a sample of US direct real estate investments. We collect the
required data on property and financial characteristics as well as the necessary appraisal-
and transaction-based data from NCREIF . We begin our analysis in 2000, the first year
for which NCREIF covers a significant number of properties and offers the full breadth
of capital expenditure data required for our analysis. We end the study period in 2015,
the last full year for which data is available at the time of writing.
Within this period, we start with entire NCREIF universe 2000-2015 and then focus
on properties that form part of NCREIF ′s NPI, have no missing values in the required
variables, and no entries of zero square feet for size. We further require properties to have
at least one year of data in order to calculate our volatility measure. We also filter out
data errors such as properties with an entry of zero for the year of construction, where
the building age is less than zero, where the real initial acquisition cost was smaller than
4 This type of model was subsequently also employed in Genesove and Mayer (2001), Crane and Hartzell (2010)
and Bokhari and Geltner (2011).
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US$1, and where the values for CAPEX are negative. 5
NCREIF reports a range of different types of capital expenditures. We focus on
capital improvements and property expansions as well as tenant incentives and lease
commissions. It is important to note that we do not consider routine repairs and main-
tenance. 6 Capital expenditures associated with tenant incentives and lease commissions
are often part of the negotiation over leasing and thus reflect market leasing conditions,
not an effort to restore the property to an undepreciated state. Our hypothesis devel-
opment on the other hand is more closely associated with value-enhancing improvement
and expansion projects that alter the physical structure of the property to restore its
quality. Therefore, we primarily focus on capital improvements and expansion capital
expenditures, but use the data on tenant incentives and lease commissions as contrasting
evidence. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the quarterly average values of the two main
groups of capital expenditures.
[Figure 3 about here.]
Recall that in the regressions for capital expenditures as a function of growth expec-
tations and volatility, we measure the two main CAPEX components (expansion and
improvement as well as tenant incentives and lease commissions) in real terms (CPI-
adjusted) and on a per square foot basis. In the regressions for the capital appreciation
return and the sales decision, we measure real CAPEX on a cumulative basis, scaled by
the initial real market value of the property.
It is worth noting that there is no mechanical relationship between capital apprecia-
tion returns and capital expenditures. Capital appreciation returns are calculated as the
quarterly change in the market value of the property. The market value of the property is
based on appraisals, not historic cost plus any capitalized expenses. Therefore, if CAPEX
are carried out, the value of CAPEX does not necessarily translate on a one-to-one basis
into an exactly equivalent increase in the market value of the property.
5 Those represent accounting anomalies where excess reserves for CAPEX projects were booked and then reversed
when the actual cost of the projects was revealed.
6 Another possibility is that CAPEX are used to reposition the building to a different use. This strategy is
beyond the scope of our analysis.
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We measure growth expectations as follows: We add a time series of yields on 10-year
US government bonds and the risk premium on a benchmark for BBB-rated corporate
bonds as proxy for the typical property risk premium. From this, we subtract the cur-
rent trailing four-quarter capitalization rate for each property (net operating income
divided by property value) to obtain an implied real growth expectation for every prop-
erty/quarter. Next, we calculate the standard deviation of those growth expectations
over four quarters, scaled by the average growth expectation over those four quarters.
We use this standard deviation as our measure for the volatility of growth expectations.
Following the literature, we include the following time-varying control variables in
our estimation: the cumulative real capital appreciation return through t− 1 as a proxy
for the disposition effect, the one-period real income return, the loan-to-value ratio, and
the years since acquisition. We include the following time-invariant control variables:
property size (sq. ft.), the log of the initial real market value when the property entered
the sample, as well as indicators for property type, geographic region and quarter or
year of acquisition. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to
mitigate undue influence of outliers. Figure 4 shows the quarterly number of properties
in the sample in Panel (a) and the quarterly number of sales in Panel (b).
[Figure 4 about here.]
Table 1 provides variable definitions and shows the descriptive statistics for the
207,399 property-quarter observations in the sample. The unconditional hazard rate of
sale in any given quarter is 3%. Total real cumulative capital expenditures on expansion
and improvement as well as tenant incentives and lease commissions both average 5% of
the real initial market value of the property. 7
In terms of the property characteristics and financial indicators, we note that the
7 Also note that our data set contains observations where capital expenditures is zero. This is a useful feature
of the data set because it rules out sample selection bias. Selection bias occurs when a sample is restricted to
observations where a variable of interest, such as capital expenditures, takes a certain value or exceeds a certain
threshold, which would be a concern for our study if we only recorded a capital expenditures observation when
capital expenditures is non-zero (and positive). However, our capital expenditures variables frequently take the
value of zero, meaning that the decision not to invest in capital expenditures is included in the NCREIF data,
mitigating this potential selection bias.
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average cumulative real capital appreciation was 0%, largely due to the impact of the
global financial crisis of 2007, and the average real income return was 2%. The average
size of the properties in our sample is approximately 190,000 sq. ft. with an average log
market value of 16.94 (US$22.75 million). The average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio is 29%.
[Table 1 about here.]
Table 2 shows the pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables.
We note that the indicator variable for sale quarter is positively correlated with tenant
incentive and lease commission capital expenditures but not significantly correlated with
improvement and expansion capital expenditures. We also note that the cumulative
appreciation return is inversely correlated with the sale quarter indicator. We explore
these unconditional results further in our main regression analysis. Beyond that, we find
no excessive correlations between the main variables of interest, alleviating concerns
around multicollinearity.
[Table 2 about here.]
6 Results
6.1 Capital expenditures as a function of growth expectations and volatility
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients for the OLS regression of equation (16),
namely capital expenditures as a function of growth expectations and volatility. Capital
expenditures are measured as real quarterly CAPEX per sq. ft. of the property. The Table
reports results for the two groups of capital expenditures (improvement and expansion,
and tenant incentives and lease commissions, respectively) and across recession versus
non-recession sub-periods as defined by NBER recession dates. To restate our hypotheses,
we expect increases in expected income growth to be positively related to subsequent
capital expenditures (hypothesis 1) and increases the the volatility of income growth
to be inversely related to subsequent capital expenditures (hypothesis 2). Our results
support the first hypothesis for both groups of capital expenditures, and are consistent
across recession and non-recession periods.
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[Table 3 about here.]
In column (1) of Table 3, we report results for CAPEX associated with property
improvements and expansion over the entire study period. First, we note a positive and
statistically significant coefficient for growth expectations. The estimated coefficient im-
plies that a one standard deviation increase in income growth from the mean corresponds
to a 0.02 percent increase in subsequent capital expenditures. While this effect appears
modest in economic terms, it is worth noting that it is measured on real (inflation-
adjusted) CAPEX per sq. ft., and that expansion and improvement projects typically
take several quarters to complete.
Consistent with model predictions, this positive relation between increases in growth
expectations and subsequent capital expenditures is based on the relative strength of
two competing factors, rent and obsolescence, in determining the return on a capital
expenditure investment. For example, if expected market rents increase, then the payoff
to restoring the property to an undepreciated state is higher because the market rent
that may be captured after a completed investment is higher.
If physical depreciation and economic obsolescence increase, then the payoff to capital
expenditures is also higher. Thus, both factors act to increase the likelihood of capital
expenditures. However, higher rental growth is likely to occur jointly with lower rates of
physical depreciation and economic obsolescence. As a result, the observed increase in
the income growth expectation may stem from higher rental growth or lower depreciation
and obsolescence. At any given point in time, these two factors could counteract each
other in the overall effect on subsequent capital expenditures. Yet, our results suggest
that the market rent effect outweighs the depreciation and obsolescence effects, possibly
because the latter effects materialize through the availability of competing undepreciated
supply, which arguably takes time to enter the market given the lengthy construction
process.
Column (2) of Table 3 shows a positive and statistically significant relation between
growth expectations and CAPEX related to tenant incentives and lease commissions
as measured over the entire study period. The estimated coefficient implies that a one
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standard deviation increase in rental growth is associated with a 0.03 percent increase in
real tenant incentives and lease commissions. We expect this positive relation between
growth expectations and subsequent tenant incentives and lease commissions as property
owners have positive incentives to invest in tenant incentives or lease commissions during
lease negotiations and these measures often result in higher base rents, which is all the
more advantageous for the owner in a period when market rents are rising.
Turning to hypothesis 2, we find that volatility of income growth expectations is sta-
tistically insignificant in determining subsequent CAPEX, across the two CAPEX types
and across recession versus non-recession periods. If volatility of income growth increases,
then real option theory suggests that the value of keeping the capital expenditure option
alive also increases. This effect should reduce subsequent capital expenditures. However,
the capital expenditure option is not the only option the property owner has available to
them. Rather, consistent with a realistic set of investor choices, there is also the dispo-
sition decision, which is, among other factors, a function of the property’s value. Next,
we will consider the relationship between CAPEX and the value of the property, by
examining the effect of different types of CAPEX on capital appreciation returns. We
will then return to explaining our findings regarding hypothesis 2.
6.2 Capital expenditures and capital value
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients for the OLS regression of equation (17),
that is, capital appreciation returns as a function of capital expenditures. Capital appre-
ciation returns are measured on a quarterly basis and in real (inflation-adjusted) terms.
Capital expenditures are measured as real cumulative CAPEX incurred up to and in-
cluding the period prior to measuring the capital appreciation return on the property,
in recognition of the fact that capital expenditure projects often span several quarters.
The Table again reports results for the two groups of capital expenditures (improvement
and expansion, and tenant incentives and lease commissions, respectively) and across
recession versus non-recession sub-periods as defined by NBER recession dates. To re-
state our hypotheses, we expect increases in capital expenditures to be positively related
to subsequent capital appreciation returns (hypothesis 3). Our results support this hy-
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pothesis for both groups of capital expenditures, but we find insignificant results for the
recessionary sub-periods.
[Table 4 about here.]
In column (1) of Table 4, we report results for capital appreciation returns over
the entire study period. First, we note a positive and statistically significant coefficient
for expansion and improvement CAPEX. The estimated coefficient implies that a one
standard deviation increase in income growth from the mean corresponds to a 0.04
percent increase in subsequent capital appreciation returns. Column (2) of Table 4 shows
a positive and significant coefficient for tenant incentives and lease commissions. The
estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in tenant incentives and lease
commissions is associated with a 0.05 percent increase in subsequent capital appreciation
returns. While these effects appear modest in economic terms, it is worth noting that
they are measured on real (inflation-adjusted) quarterly capital appreciation returns.
Our finding here also helps explain the evidence in relation to hypothesis 2. If uncer-
tainty around income growth increases, then uncertainty around the value of the asset
increases, and as a result, the discount rate is likely to increase. A higher discount rate
implies a higher probability of sale, everything else being equal. However, an outright as-
set sale results in a lost chance of recovery. An alternative way of recovering lost ground
between the required rate of return and the actual rate of return is to invest in capital
expenditures to increase the property’s value. Our findings regarding hypothesis 3 show
that there indeed appears to be a positive relationship between capital expenditures and
the capital appreciation return on the property. The cost of losing the capital expen-
diture option is then viewed as the price of keeping the asset and thus retaining the
optionality of benefiting from a recovery. Our results are consistent with the value-add
strategy balancing out the effect of losing the capital expenditure option. Our finding
is intuitive when we consider that the positive payoff from an eventual disposition in a
stronger economic environment is compounded by the improvements that were made to
the asset during the period of uncertainty.
Our findings in this section and the previous section relate to the literature on the
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optionality of capital expenditures. Consistent with real options theory, Bond, Shilling,
and Wurtzebach (2014) find that CAPEX increase with market lease rates. Our work
is consistent with their findings. Further, Peng and Thibodeau (2011) and Ghosh and
Petrova (2015) find that capital expenditures decrease in the level of economic uncer-
tainty, which increases the value of the option to delay improvements. Our work extends
these prior studies in two ways. First, we study income prospects and volatility in those
prospects specific to individual buildings rather than general economic uncertainty. Sec-
ond, we consider a full set of investor choices that includes the capital expenditure option
and the disposition decision. As a result, we derive a different set of predictions, under-
scoring the value of recognizing a fuller set of investor choices. Further, these previous
studies find mixed evidence for whether, and if so, to what extent, capital expenditures
are capitalized into property values. Our results are more consistent with Ghosh and
Petrova (2015), who find that CAPEX are to some extent incorporated into values.
6.3 Consequences for disposition decisions
Table 5 presents the coefficients from the estimation of equation (18) testing our
hypothesis concerning disposition decisions as a function of capital expenditures. Ac-
cording to hypothesis 3, we expect an inverse relationship between capital expenditures
and subsequent dispositions. The coefficients reported in Table 5 are consistent with
this hypothesis as far as expansion and improvement CAPEX in the full study period
(Column (1)) and the non-recession sub-periods (Column (2)) are concerned.
[Table 5 about here.]
In economic terms, the coefficients reported in Column (1) of Table 5 imply that a one
standard deviation increase in expansion and improvement CAPEX is associated with a
decline in the log hazard rate of 0.11 percent during the full study period and 0.10 percent
during the non-recession sub-periods. We find no significant results during recessionary
sub-periods or for tenant incentive and lease commission expenditures. Our findings
suggest that the relation between capital expenditures and subsequent dispositions is
conditional on the economic environment. If we observe capital expenditures during a
period of economic expansion, then the odds of the HBU value being lower than the
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alternative SBU value are lower, making a sale less likely. Our estimates support this
rationale.
We interpret our findings as evidence of the varying marginal value of capital expen-
ditures in terms of improving the gain on a potential sale of the asset. During a period of
increasing property values, the marginal gain on sale that can be achieved from making
substantial improvements or carrying out expansions that change the nature of the asset
may be low, leading to an inverse relationship between capital expenditures and the
likelihood of sale.
To explicitly test the disposition effect, we include the cumulative real appreciation
return in equation (18). According to the disposition effect hypothesis, the probability
of property sale should be positively related to the cumulative real appreciation return.
However, the marginal effect reported in Table 5 indicates an inverse relation between
cumulative appreciation and the hazard rate of disposition after controlling for the effects
of capital expenditures and income growth expectations. The marginal effect suggests
that a one standard deviation increase in cumulative real appreciation results in a 0.42
percent decline in the log hazard rate of subsequent sale. This finding is contrary to the
evidence typically presented in support of the disposition effect. For instance, Crane and
Hartzell (2010) report that a higher cumulative appreciation return is associated with
a higher hazard rate of sale, consistent with the behavioral notion that investors hold
losing investments in an attempt to avoid realizing financial losses. We find the opposite
effect in our data. Our finding is also contrary to prior work on the disposition effect
in real estate as presented in Genesove and Mayer (2001), Bokhari and Geltner (2011),
and Crane and Hartzell (2010).
There may be several reasons for this inconsistency. First, in contrast to Genesove
and Mayer (2001), we focus on commercial, not residential properties. The sophisticated
institutional investors that constitute the sample of investors in typical NCREIF prop-
erties may be less sensitive to the loss aversion bias. Second, our findings also contrast
with Bokhari and Geltner (2011) who focus on commercial properties held by institu-
tional investors. However, our study differs from their work in the data set employed
22
(NCREIF in this study versus Real Capital Analytics in their analysis), the sample
period (our work extends beyond 2009, the date when the sample in Bokhari and Geltner
(2011) ends), and we explicitly control for the possibility of a value-add strategy where
investors continue to hold a poorly performing property until they have made sufficient
improvements via capital expenditures to realize a gain on sale. The consideration for
a value-add investment strategy is also a distinguishing feature between our work and
Crane and Hartzell (2010) who study the evidence for the disposition effect in REITs.
7 Conclusion
We present evidence for an alternative rational explanation to the alleged disposition
effect in real estate investment holdings: a value-add investment strategy that continues
to hold a poorly performing property not in an irrational attempt to avoid realizing a
loss, but because the investment strategy requires holding the asset until substantial
improvements via capital expenditures facilitate a gain on sale. Corollaries are evidence
to support the real options prediction that higher expected income growth increases
subsequent capital expenditures, and that both expansion and improvement as well as
tenant incentive and lease commission expenditures are capitalized into property values.
Our work expends the existing literature on real estate CAPEX by separately consid-
ering expansion and improvement projects as well as tenant incentives and lease commis-
sions, by incorporating the option to sell and by conditioning the relationships described
on the prevailing economic environment.
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8 Figures and Tables
Evolution of threshold values H* as a function of rental growth and volatility
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(a) H* as a function of expected rental growth α
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(b) H* as a function of rental growth volatility σ
Fig. 1. The figure shows the evolution of the threshold levels of rent H* that trigger investment in capital
expenditures as a function of expected rental growth α (Panel (a)) and volatility of rental growth σ (Panel (b)).
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Evolution of the probability of sale as a function of capital expenditures
(a) Probability of sale as a function of CAPEX for different α
(b) Probability of sale as a function of CAPEX for different σ
Fig. 2. The figure shows the probability of sale as a function of CAPEX with different levels of rental growth
α (Panel (a)) and volatility of rental growth σ (Panel (b)).
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OLS models for capital expenditures as a function of growth expectations and volatility
– Coefficient estimates are shown –
Full period Non-Recession Recession
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Imp/Exp TI/LC Imp/Exp TI/LC Imp/Exp TI/LC
Growth Expectation 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.017***
(6.23) (7.50) (4.00) (5.78) (6.36) (5.62)
Growth Volatility -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.34) (0.64) (-0.51) (1.47) (-1.47) (-0.82)
Log Sq Ft -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(-7.68) (-8.83) (-4.78) (-4.22) (-7.34) (-9.46)
Log Real Initial Market Value 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(9.81) (12.11) (7.32) (9.06) (8.00) (10.14)
Income Return -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.011 -0.023**
(-5.02) (-4.59) (-5.28) (-4.17) (-1.33) (-2.64)
LTV Ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.07) (-0.44) (0.37) (-1.18) (1.80) (1.04)
Years Since Acquisition 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.07) (0.73) (0.75) (-0.02) (1.25) (1.73)
Constant 0.001 -0.001* -0.000 -0.002*** 0.003** 0.004***
(1.48) (-2.17) (-0.85) (-4.05) (3.22) (4.45)
Observations 74,273 74,273 54,458 54,458 19,815 19,815
R-squared 0.052 0.139 0.049 0.155 0.075 0.134
Property type effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Division effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No of property clusters 8,035 8,035 7,769 7,769 4,385 4,385
Table 3
The table presents the coefficient estimates from the OLS regression CAPEXit = γ0+γ1GEi,t−1+γ2V OLi,t−1+
γ3Xi,t−1+uit, where CAPEXit is the firm-quarter observations of capital expenditures per square foot, GEi,t−1
is the expected rate of property income growth at time t−1, V OLi,t−1 is the volatility of growth expectations over
the preceding four quarters scaled by the average growth expectation over this period, Xt−1 is a matrix of control
variables measured at time t− 1, and uit is the residual. CAPEX is shown separately for expansion/improvement
(Exp/Imp) as well as tenant incentives/lease commissions (TI/LC). All regressions are estimated for the full
study period, as well as recession/non-recession sub-periods based on NBER recession dates. Xt−1 includes the
following control variables: the one-period real income return, the loan-to-value ratio, the time since acquisition,
property size (sq ft), the log of the initial real market value when the property entered the sample, as well as
indicators for property type, geographic region, and quarter. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and
99th percentile to mitigate undue influence of outliers. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All right-hand side
variables are lagged by one quarter. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by
property. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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OLS models for real capital appreciation returns as a function of capital expenditures
– Coefficient estimates are shown –
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full period Non-Recession Recession
Expansion and Improvement 0.004** 0.004** 0.004
(3.07) (2.84) (1.15)
Tenant Incentives and Lease Commissions 0.005** 0.007** -0.002
(2.71) (3.11) (-0.37)
Log Sq Ft 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(6.19) (4.95) (3.42)
Log Real Initial Market Value 0.000 0.000 -0.003***
(-0.96) (1.38) (-5.63)
Income Return 0.243*** 0.196*** 0.626***
(10.83) (8.14) (9.83)
LTV Ratio 0.002*** 0.000 0.012***
(4.36) (0.85) (9.62)
Years Since Acquisition -0.000* -0.000* 0.000
(-2.30) (-2.44) (-0.31)
Constant -0.026*** -0.028*** -0.012*
(-10.25) (-10.20) (-2.21)
Observations 247,492 210,415 37,077
R-squared 0.149 0.076 0.219
Property type effects Yes Yes Yes
Quarter effects Yes Yes Yes
Division effects Yes Yes Yes
No of property clusters 13,793 13,594 6,520
Table 4
The table presents the real capital appreciation return APPi,t = γ0 + γ1CAPEXi,t−1 + γ2Xi,t−1 + uit where
CAPEXi,t−1 measures cumulative real capital expenditures up to and including t − 1, and Xt−1 contains the
covariates from Equation (16). CAPEX is shown separately for expansion/improvement (Exp/Imp) as well as
tenant incentives/lease commissions (TI/LC). The regressions are estimated for the full study period, as well as
recession/non-recession sub-periods based on NBER recession dates. Xt−1 includes the following control variables:
the one-period real income return, the loan-to-value ratio, the time since acquisition, property size (sq ft), the
log of the initial real market value when the property entered the sample, as well as indicators for property type,
geographic region, and quarter. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate
undue influence of outliers. The variables are defined as in Table 1. All right-hand side variables are lagged by
one quarter. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered by property. Significance
is indicated as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Cox partial likelihood models for the likelihood of sale as a function of capital expenditures
– Coefficient estimates are shown –
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Full period Non-Recession Recession
Expansion and Improvement -0.010*** -0.009** -0.033
(-3.41) (-3.13) (-1.54)
Tenant Incentives and Lease Commissions 0.006 0.006 -0.004
(1.47) (1.63) (-0.20)
Cumulative Appreciation Return -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.037***
(-12.37) (-10.51) (-8.60)
Income Return -0.04 -0.046 0.084
(-0.89) (-1.01) (0.40)
LTV Ratio -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.041***
(-5.16) (-3.83) (-5.99)
Years Since Acquisition -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003
(-11.77) (-11.08) (-1.50)
Log Sq Ft 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.094
(4.60) (4.53) (1.00)
Log Real Initial Market Value -0.232*** -0.229*** -0.292***
(-10.47) (-9.94) (-3.68)
Observations 247,492 209,612 37,880
Property type effects Yes Yes Yes
Division effects Yes Yes Yes
Acquisition Year effects Yes Yes Yes
No of property clusters 13,793 13,590 6,598
Table 5
The table presents the Cox hazard rate of sale h(i, t) = h0(i, t) exp(γ1CAPEXi,t−1 + γ2CAPPi,t−1 + γ3Xi,t−1)
where h0(i, t) denotes the baseline hazard rate, Xt−1 contains the covariates from Equation (16). CAPEX is
shown separately for expansion/improvement (Exp/Imp) as well as tenant incentives/lease commissions (TI/LC).
The regressions are estimated for the full study period, as well as recession/non-recession sub-periods based on
NBER recession dates. Xt−1 includes the following control variables: the one-period real income return, the loan-
to-value ratio, the time since acquisition, property size (sq ft), the log of the initial real market value when the
property entered the sample, as well as indicators for property type, geographic region, and acquisition year. All
continuous variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentile to mitigate undue influence of outliers. The variables
are defined as in Table 1. All right-hand side variables are lagged by one quarter. We estimate the coefficients
via Cox’s partial likelihood method. Following standard practice, properties that are not sold during the sample
period are included in the estimation but are considered right censored. Variables are defined as in Table 1. All
right-hand side variables are lagged by one quarter. Z-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard
errors clustered by property. Significance is indicated as follows: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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Evolution of CAPEX components
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(b) Tenant incentives and lease commissions
Fig. 3. The figure shows the evolution of expansion and improvement CAPEX (Panel (a)) and tenant incentive
and lease commission CAPEX (Panel (b)) over the period 2000 to 2014.
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Evolution of sample properties and sales
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(a) Number of properties
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Fig. 4. The figure shows the evolution of the quarterly number of properties in our final sample (Panel (a)) and
the number of property sales (Panel (b)) over the period 2000 to 2014.
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